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Lead-Lag Relationships in an Embryonic Stock Market: Exploring the 
Role of Institutional Ownership and Liquidity 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the past 30 years, we have learnt a lot about emerging markets finance. The bulk of the 
research focuses on issues related to the impact of market integration and financial 
liberalization on asset prices and their relationship to those in developed economies. Out of 
this line of research we now understand, for example, that emerging markets are relatively 
inefficient and are characterized by infrequent trading. In these circumstances asset returns 
are not normally distributed, have high serial correlation and are slow to adjust to current 
information.
1
 Slow price adjustment has also been documented for prices of both individual 
stocks and portfolios traded in developed economies. In particular, numerous studies provide 
evidence of lead-lag effects in cross-autocorrelations of stock returns, strongly suggesting 
that some stocks react to information faster than other stocks. One explanation offered for 
these lead-lad effects is variation in institutional ownership between stocks.
2
 Data analyses of 
stock returns from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) provide strong support for this 
hypothesis (Badrinath et al. 1995; Sias and Starks, 1997; Chuang and Lee, 2011).  
 
Sias and Starks (1997) review various theoretical attempts to explain how the presence of 
institutional investors affects the behaviour of stock prices.  Institutional investors trade in the 
information they collect and the prices of the corresponding stocks will reflect the 
information set observed by these investors. While some of this information is stock specific, 
a portion will be general in nature, and therefore, relevant to the pricing of stocks that are 
held by non-institutional investors (institutionally, unfavoured stocks). By observing the 
                                                          
1
For reviews of this extensive literature, see Bekaert and Harvey (2002, 2003). 
2
Alternative explanations include non-synchronous trading (Lo and MacKinlay, 1990), variations in analyst 
coverage (Brennan et al. 1993) and variations in liquidity (Chordia and Swaminathan, 2000). 
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prices of the institutionally favoured stocks, non-institutional investors will find information 
relevant to the pricing of the rest of the stocks. By trading on this information, they will 
transmit the informational content from the lagged prices of the institutionally favoured to the 
current prices of the unfavoured stocks.  
 
This lead-lag, cross-autocorrelation relationship has been empirically investigated in the 
context of the larger, emerging markets. For instance, Chan and Hameed (2006) use data 
from Standard &Poor’s (formerly the International Finance Corporation) Emerging Markets 
Database (EMDB), which covers more than 2000 stocks from 45 emerging markets. The 
authors find that, after controlling for the influence of firm size on lead–lag relations, the 
returns of a high analyst-following portfolio lead the returns of a low analyst-following 
portfolio more than the converse. Similar results were obtained by Boyer and Kumagai, Y 
(2006) using the same data set to explore contagion and by other studies that focus on single-
country stock exchanges (Gebka, 2008 for Poland; Xu, Chan, Jiang and Yi, 2013 for China). 
Further, Bae, Ozoguz, Tanc and Wirjanto (2012) also using the EMDB database assess 
whether the degree of accessibility of foreign investors to emerging stock markets has a 
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the diffusion of global market information across stocks in emerging 
markets. They show that greater accessibility reduces price delay to global market 
information. They also ﬁnd that the returns of highly investible or accessible stocks lead 
those of non-investible stocks, with highly investible stocks incorporating global information 
more quickly. The same conclusion is reached by studies of single-country stock exchanges 
(Lee, Li and Wang, 2010 for China; Park and Chung, 2007 for S. Korea) and stock index 
futures (Bohl, Salm and Schuppli, 2011 for Poland). In contrast, Chan, Menkveld, and Yang 
(2007) also studying the Chinese market find that lead-lag effects are likely to capture private 
local information for which local investors have an advantage over foreign investors.  
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Financial liberalization and market integration encourage the inflow of institutional investors 
in emerging markets, and therefore this provides a natural testing ground for the view that 
differences in the level of institutional investment across stocks account for lead-lag 
relationships; specifically, for the hypothesis that the prices of stocks with a high level of 
institutional investment lead those of stocks with low institutional investment. One serious 
obstacle for this type of work has been the lack of data from embryonic markets on 
either/both individual stock returns or/and information about institutional ownership. This 
study fills this gap in the literature by analyzing data from the Trinidad and Tobago Stock 
Exchange (TTSE). This emerging market is in its embryonic stages of development and has 
experienced a high level of investment activity over this past decade. In addition, its 
regulatory, microstructure and information environments are substantially less developed 
than those of the stock markets in the industrial and larger, emerging economies. For 
instance, there is a high level of transactions costs and thin trading in this market. (Appendix 
Table A.1 provides some data on trading activity in TTSE for the period covered by this 
study, and section 2 provides some background information on the market and regulatory 
conditions of TTSE.) Much existing work on developed stock markets or advanced emerging 
markets has explored lead-lag relations in the context of relatively liquid market conditions. 
Here we are able to explore lead-lag relationships between stocks under relatively illiquid 
market conditions; conditions that are likely to apply in other smaller and early stage stock 
markets. (In Appendix Table A.2 we set out some summary information for several other, 
embryonic stock markets in the Latin America and Caribbean region.) Our main finding is 
that greater liquidity both increases (ceteris paribus) the lead effect for institutionally 
favoured stocks and the speed of adjustment or catch-up of lagging, institutionally 
unfavoured stocks. 
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One feature of this study is that it uses both individual stock/firm level data and constructed 
portfolio information from an emerging market in its embryonic stages of development. The 
existing literature tends to use only portfolio level data for relatively large emerging markets 
when exploring lead-lag effects.
3
 Any findings of lead-lag effects in the context of an 
embryonic market such as TTSE where there is little trading in portfolios could be 
attributable to a lead-lag relation between some (or even few) of the stocks of the portfolios. 
This gives rise to the possibility that the results may not be reflective of the true cross-
autocorrelation between all the stocks in the portfolios. Here we apply our empirical analysis 
to portfolio information for comparison with the existing literature, but also to returns data at 
the individual stock level. This provides a robustness test for any identified lead-lag effects 
between the returns of (individual and portfolios of) stocks with a high institutional 
investment and those with low institutional investment.  
 
For our empirical tests, and in line with the dominant methodology employed in the literature, 
we apply a VAR framework to assess lead-lag cross-autocorrelation between ‘high’ and ‘low’ 
institutionally owned stocks in the TTSE. This ensures that any observed lead-lag cross-
autocorrelation is not a spurious manifestation of the autocorrelation of the low institutional 
ownership equity returns and the contemporaneous correlations between the low institutional 
ownership and the high institutional ownership equity returns. Given that other studies (cited 
above) of the NYSE and some emerging markets find that firm size is correlated with the 
level of institutional investment, we check that the lead-lag relation is robust across the stocks 
                                                          
3See, for example, Bohl and Brzeszczyński (2006). Using data on foreign ownership rather than institutional 
ownership, taken from the EMDB database of emerging stock markets, Bae et al. (2012) also analyse the 
relationship between lead-lag cross-autocorrelations and the speed of adjustment to new information, but again 
using portfolio data. Also, the markets in this study are mainly secondary emerging markets (e.g. South Africa, 
Malaysia, Brazil and Portugal), which are much larger than the TTSE in terms of market capitalization and 
number of listed firms. They also have liquidity far superior to that of the TTSE.  
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of firms of different sizes. We also check that the relation is robust across stocks with 
differing levels of analyst coverage (Brennan et al. 1993). This market characteristic has also 
been offered as a possible cause of the cross-autocorrelation relationship.  
 
Syriopoulos (2006), analysing lead-lag effects between stock prices from US, Germany and a 
group of emerging Central European market, finds robust and persistent short-run US stock 
market effects to Granger cause German and Central Europe stock market reactions. The 
author attributes these effects to the international leading role of the US stock market that is 
supported by its market depth (capitalization and turnover). Liquidity effects have also been 
found by Poshakwale and Theobald (2006) who analyse using stock market data from India 
the impact of thin trading on lead-lag relationships. We therefore also explore the relationship 
between institutional ownership and liquidity in the current context, namely for an embryonic 
and relatively illiquid stock market. We explore both the relative importance of ownership 
and liquidity effects in accounting directly for lead-lag relationships (across stocks of firms of 
differing size), and the conditioning influence of liquidity on the ownership effect (through 
the inclusion of interaction terms). Interestingly we find that the separate, direct effect of 
institutional ownership (independent of the liquidity effect) holds, but that greater liquidity 
both increases (ceteris paribus) the lead effect for institutionally favoured stocks and the 
speed of adjustment or catch-up of lagging, institutionally unfavoured stocks. We view these 
findings as being strongly supportive of information advantage explanation of the 
institutional ownership effect in the context of this embryonic equity market. 
 
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. In Section 2 we briefly describe the 
microstructure of the TTSE. In Section 3 we present the modelling framework that is 
employed to test the institutional ownership hypothesis. In Section 4 we describe our data set 
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and provide some preliminary descriptive statistics of the relation between institutional 
ownership and the cross autocorrelation in equity returns. In Section 5 we report our base 
empirical results on the role of institutional ownership in explaining cross-auto-correlation 
and some associated robustness analysis, while in Section 6 we explore the relationship 
between institutional ownership and liquidity effects in the distinctive setting of an 
embryonic stock market. Finally, we conclude in Section 7. 
 
2. Brief Overview of the TTSE 
The TTSE was officially established in 1981. Since its establishment, TTSE has undergone 
several institutional changes to conform with international standards and create modern 
infrastructures for trading. One major institutional development was the establishment of the 
Trinidad and Tobago Central Depository (TTCD) in January 1998. The TTCD has functioned 
as a clearing agent and facilitated efficient and secure operation of book-entry systems. Its 
establishment was a forerunner to automated, electronic trading on the exchange. 
 
Prior to the automation of trading, the TTSE functioned as a periodic call auction, where 
securities were traded at discrete time intervals when ‘‘calls’’ were made for securities. 
Orders were detained at fixed locations (brokerage houses) and then brought to the floor of 
the TTSE to be executed in a multilateral transaction (batch) at a uniform price when ‘‘calls’’ 
were made for securities. All bids and offers were made under an open outcry system, which 
coexisted with a ‘‘trading board’’ that recorded the ‘‘calls’’ and matched the orders of 
brokers. In order to increase transaction speed and reduce information asymmetries, an 
automated order-driven system of trading was introduced to the TTSE in March 2005. This 
facilitated the continuous trading of stocks on the exchange. Trading commences at 9:30 am 
on the floor of the TTSE (although electronic trading enables brokers to trade also directly 
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from their offices). The market, however, enters a pre-open session between 8:00am and 
9:30am, on each trading day. During this time, brokers enter orders into the automated 
system, but these are not immediately matched. The system then calculates the opening 
trading price for each security, based on the volume of bids and offers made by each broker 
in the pre-open session. When the market opens, trading occurs in all securities 
simultaneously. During the course of the trading day, brokers adjust the terms on the 
remaining orders to either buy or sell shares. The closing price of each security is established 
by the last price at which it was traded. The introduction of electronic trading has therefore 
enhanced transparency and transaction speed on TTSE. It has also served to attract an influx 
of local and regional investors, thereby increasing the market’s liquidity and trading 
frequency.  
 
The TTSE has also undergone several regulatory reforms, since its inception. Chief among 
these was the establishment of the Trinidad and Tobago Securities and Exchange 
Commission (TTSEC) in 1995, which is the formal regulatory body for the stock exchange. It 
supervises all trading activity and seeks to curb illegal and unethical trading practices, such as 
insider trading and market rigging. Other important legislation was designed to regulate the 
trading activities of foreign investors. For example, foreign investors were only granted 
permission to invest in the TTSE in 1997; preventing  international investors from holding 
shares in excess of 30% of the issued share capital of the listed companies. To acquire 
additional stocks, these investors require a special licence from the Government of Trinidad 
and Tobago.  
3. Modelling Framework 
We hypothesize that the returns of stocks with a high level of institutional ownership 
(institutionally favoured stocks) lead the returns of stocks with a low institutional ownership 
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(institutionally unfavoured stocks).
4
 This lead-lag relation would arise when the 
institutionally favoured stocks reflect market-wide information faster that the institutionally 
unfavoured stocks.
5
 We assume that institutional investors engage in more information-
gathering activities compared to individual investors. This allows them to update their 
valuations on the stocks more quickly than individual investors.  
 
To examine the above hypothesis, we use a vector autoregression framework, where we 
evaluate whether returns of HI stocks lead the returns of LO stocks , where HI denotes a firm 
with high institutional ownership (i.e. are institutionally favoured) and LO denotes the stocks 
of  firm with low institutional ownership (institutionally unfavoured). (The operationalization 
of the concept of HI and LO stocks in the present study is described in section 4.) This is 
tested using the following bivariate VAR: 
 , , ,
1 1
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LO t LO k LO t k k HI t k t
k k
R a R b R  
 
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 
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 where ,LO tR  and ,HI tR  are the returns of stock LO and HI, respectively, at time t. 
1
K
k
k
b

 in 
equation (1) and 
1
K
k
k
c

 in equation (2) are the sums of the cross-autoregressive coefficients. 
The number of lags in each equation is selected using the Akaike and Schwartz information 
criteria. Since the regressors are the same for both equations (1) and (2), the VAR can be 
efficiently estimated by running ordinary least squares (OLS) on each equation individually.  
                                                          
4
 Institutional investors only hold a subset of stocks for which the volume of information and the expected 
benefits of information collection are large relative to the costs. In addition, these stocks must satisfy legal 
“prudence” requirements (see Merton, 1987). 
5
 Recall that the information gathered by investors pertain to the stocks that they invest in. While some of this 
information is firm specific, a portion is general in nature and applicable to the pricing of all stocks, that is, 
market-wide information. 
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In equation (1), if the lagged values of RHI can predict the contemporaneous value of RLO, 
while controlling for the predictive power of the lagged values of RLO, then RHI is said to 
Granger-cause RLO.
6
 We examine whether the sum of the cross-autoregressive coefficients 
(the coefficients related to the lagged values of RHI) in equation (1),
1
K
k
k
b

 , is statistically 
different from zero using a Wald test.
7
. If 
1
K
k
k
b

 is found to be statistically different from zero, 
this implies that the lagged HI returns have predictive power for the current LO stock returns, 
independent to that of the lagged LO returns. This version of the Granger causality test also 
indicates whether the causal relationship from HI to LO is positive or negative, using the sign 
attached to the sum of the cross-autoregressive coefficients. Similarly, equation (2) allows us 
to determine whether the lagged returns of LO are able to forecast the current returns of HI, 
by testing whether the cross-autoregressive coefficient is 
1
K
k
k
c

 is statistically different from 
zero, while controlling for the predictive power of the lagged RHI values.  
 
Next, we test whether the ability of the lagged values of RHI to predict the current value of 
RLO is better than the ability of the lagged values of RLO to predict the current value of RHI. 
This test of asymmetry in the cross-autocorrelation between the returns of the HI and LO 
stocks establishes whether HI leads LO. To achieve this, we conduct a cross-equation test by 
evaluating whether the sum of the cross-autoregressive coefficients in equation (1),
1
K
k
k
b

 , is 
                                                          
6
 We control for the lagged values of RLO to ensure that the cross-autocorrelation between RHI and RLO is not a 
restatement of RLO’s own return autocorrelation. Under this framework, we are therefore controlling for the 
possibility that the lagged values of RHI are simply noisy proxies for the lagged values of RLO. 
7
 This is consistent with Brennan et al. (1993), Sias and Starks (1997), Chordia and Swaminathan (2000), Hou 
(2007) and Chuang and Lee (2011). 
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greater than the sum of the cross-autoregressive coefficients in equation (2), 
1
K
k
k
c

 , where 
1
K
k
k
b

 should be statistically different from zero. We use a Wald test to assess the null 
hypothesis that
1 1
K K
k k
k k
b c
 
  . If the null is rejected, and the sum of the bk coefficients is greater 
than the sum of the ck coefficients
1 1
K K
k k
k k
b c
 

 
 
 
  , we can conclude that the ability of the 
lagged returns of HI to predict the current LO returns (even after controlling for the own 
autocorrelation of LO) is better than the ability of the lagged LO returns to predict the current 
HI returns. This indicates that the returns of HI lead the returns of LO, and HI has a faster 
speed of adjustment to information than LO.  
 
Brennan et al.  (1993) show that if the lagged returns of LO predict the current returns of HI 
with a negative sign, that is, if 
1
K
k
k
c

 is negative, while 
1
K
k
k
b

 is positive, then the inequality 
1 1
K K
k k
k k
b c
 
   is met and it can be concluded that LO reacts to information more sluggishly in 
relation to HI. Therefore HI leads LO. Chordia and Swaminathan (2000) point out that taking 
the sign into account makes this version of the Granger Causality test more reliable for 
assessing lead-lag effects than the conventional Granger Causality test.  
 
4. Data and Preliminary Statistics 
 Our sample consists of each firm listed for trading on the TTSE over the period January 2001 
to December 2012. To be included in the sample, a firm must have been listed for trading on 
the market for the entire sample period.
8
 Thirty firms meet this criterion and are therefore 
                                                          
8
 See Table A.3 in the Appendix for the full list of firms. 
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used in our analysis. For each of these firms, we obtain data on their daily stock returns from 
the TTSE. We also use data on their daily volume traded and annual market capitalisation 
from the exchange. Annual data on the percentage of shares held by institutional investors in 
each firm is compiled using the yearly company reports produced by the Trinidad and 
Tobago Securities and Exchange Commission (TTSEC).
9
 These institutional investors mainly 
comprise of financial companies such as banks, insurance companies, pension funds and 
investment advisors, to name a few.
10
 For the purpose of this study, we measure institutional 
ownership in each firm using the average of the annual portion of stocks owned by these 
institutional investors over the sample period. We base our analysis on the mean institutional 
ownership, as there were no significant changes in the annual level of institutional investment 
in each firm over the sample period.  
 
Lo and MacKinlay (1990) report that the returns of large firms lead the returns of small firms, 
that is, the lagged returns of large firms are correlated with the contemporaneous returns of 
small firms. In our sample, the cross-sectional correlation between the mean firm size and 
level of institutional ownership is statistically significant at the 5% level: ρ = 0.373.11 This 
positive correlation naturally leads to the question of whether firm size effects are subsumed 
by the institutional ownership effects, or vice versa. We therefore control for any effects 
which firm size may have on the lead-lag relationship. By controlling for such effects we are 
able to discern whether the cross-autocorrelation is actually attributed to institutional 
ownership and not due to the effects of differences in size of the listed firms.  
                                                          
9
Our sample period starts from January 2001 as information on the level of institutional ownership for each firm 
is only available from this date. Note also that automated trading on the market commenced only in March, 
2000. 
10
Note that the finance literature does not consider the government itself to be an institutional investor. It 
regards the government a separate class of investor. This is noted by Harris (2002), who points out that there are 
three broad classes of investors, namely individual and institutional investors, and the government. Therefore, 
the portion of TTSE shares owned by the government is not included as part of our measure of institutional 
ownership. 
11
A number of other studies find that firm size is highly and positively correlated with the level of institutional 
ownership (for example Badrinath et al., 1995; Sias and Starks, 1997; Næs and Skjeltorp, 2003; Rubin, 2007). 
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To control for the effects of firm size we form five size based quintiles by ranking the 30 
listed firms in our sample according to their average firm size over 2001 to 2012.
12
  Each 
stock is assigned to one of five quintiles, with six stocks in every quintile. For each one of 
these quintiles, we test whether the daily returns of the stock with the highest mean level of 
institutional ownership (HI) leads the daily returns of the stock with the lowest mean level of 
institutional ownership stock (LO).
 13
  
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the HI and LO firms in each size quintile i=1,...,5.
14
 
Quintile 1 is the highest size based quintile and 5 is the lowest. Note that in each quintile, the 
HI (LO) firms represented in this table not only have the highest (lowest) mean institutional 
ownership, but also have the highest (lowest) institutional ownership in the same quintile for 
each year in the sample period. For example, the stock RBL has the highest institutional 
ownership (1) on average and (2) in each year, for quintile 1 over the sample period. There 
are no cases where stocks are classed as HI / LO in some years but not in other years. This is 
because the degree of institutional ownership in each firm only changes marginally over the 
sample period. In which case, the average degree of institutional ownership provides a 
consistent picture of the level of institutional ownership among stocks and is appropriate for 
ranking stocks as HI and LO. 
 
 
                                                          
12Firm size is measured using the ratio of the firm’s market capitalisation to the overall market capitalisation. A 
higher value of this ratio indicates a larger the firm size. To rank the listed firms according to size, we take the 
average value of the firm size for each firm over the eight year sample period. 
13
As is noted earlier, we use the mean level of institutional investment, as the annual levels for each stock do not 
substantially change over the sample period. In fact, we find that there are no cases where some stocks are 
classed as HI / LO in some years but not in other years. Therefore, those stocks with the highest and lowest 
institutional ownership in each size quintile remain the same in each year of the sample period. 
14
Note that the various HI (LO) stocks do not belong to the same sector. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Size-Institutional Ownership Stocks 
 
Notes: The table presents summary statistics for the highest (HI) and the lowest (LO) institutionally owned stocks 
in five size based quintiles for the sample period January 2001 to December 2008. These quintiles are formed by 
ranking all firms listed for trading on the market for the entire sample period, where quintile 1 refers to the highest 
size quintile while 5 is the lowest. Size refers to the average annual size of the HI and LO stocks in each quintile 
over the sample period. We compute size by firstly finding the average of each stock’s market capitalisation 
expressed as a proportion of the total market capitalisation over the sample period. Institutional ownership denotes 
the mean of the annual values of the proportion of stocks held by institutional investors over our sample period. 
 
Table 1 shows that for all the quintiles, the overall mean and standard deviation of the daily 
returns for the HI stocks are higher than those of the LO stocks. The table also reports the 
mean size and institutional ownership for the HI and LO stocks in each quintile over our 
sample period. We also find in all quintiles that the mean institutional ownership increases 
with firm size, implying that institutional investors favour large capitalised stocks over small 
capitalised stocks. This pattern is also found by Chuang and Lee (2011). This provides an 
opportunity to test whether institutional ownership has an independent influence on the cross-
autocorrelation patterns. Such a result may suggest that some institutional traders invest in 
smaller stocks for the purpose of portfolio diversification or increasing profits, despite the 
  Stock Returns   Volume    
Quintile Stock Mean% Std. Dev. %  Mean Std. Dev. 
 Mean 
Size 
Mean Institutional 
Ownership 
          
1 HI 0.053 2.089  23578.456 115736.900  0.158 0.833 
 LO -0.029 0.742  56965.540 476053.400  0.079 0.541 
          
2 HI 0.177 2.688  30740.372 364153.211  0.030 0.825 
 LO 0.032 2.043  9988.220 33663.700  0.036 0.521 
          
3 HI 0.140 1.358  2245.797 51742.700  0.026 0.860 
 LO 0.093 0.971  12421.454 346647.315  0.018 0.412 
          
4 HI 0.109 2.631  110402.112 466381.450  0.009 0.770 
 LO 0.023 1.711  42830.086 137024.320  0.007 0.310 
          
5 HI 0.119 2.061  3901.047 21216.400  0.003 0.730 
 LO 0.062 0.990  8427.645 27152.570  0.002 0.280 
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possibility of incurring high information set-up costs associated with these stocks. If 
institutional ownership does indeed have an independent effect, then the returns on the HI 
stock should lead the returns on the LO stock in quintile 2. If, on the other hand, institutional 
ownership is simply a proxy of firm size, then the LO stock returns should lead the HI stock 
returns in quintile 2.  
 
Further, the table shows that the mean volume of HI and LO stocks traded does not increase 
with firm size. We also find that the cross-sectional correlation between the average volume 
traded and the average firm size of the thirty stocks in our sample is statistically insignificant: 
ρ = 0.164.15  In this regard, volume does not proxy for firm size, which implies that any 
relation uncovered between liquidity and the lead-lag relation is independent of firm size. We 
also find that the volume traded does not proxy for the level of institutional ownership. The 
table shows that the mean and the standard deviation of the volume of HI stocks traded are 
lower than those of the LO stocks in quintiles (1 and 3). Moreover, the cross-sectional 
correlation between these variables, which is computed using the thirty stocks in our sample, 
is not statistically significant: ρ = 0.110. Such a finding is in contrast to Sias and Starks 
(1997), who point out that high institutionally owned stocks should be more liquid, as there 
are lower transaction costs associated with such stocks.
16
 This, however, may not hold in the 
case of an emerging market such as the TTSE, as microstructures are different. Specifically, 
there are more severe thin-trading and higher transaction costs associated with the stocks in 
this market, in comparison to developed markets. Therefore, it may be possible that some 
stocks with a high institutional ownership may not trade very often, and would therefore have 
a lower liquidity.  
                                                          
15
This is in contrast to Chordia and Swaminathan (2000), who find that volumes traded are highly and positively 
correlated. 
16
Sias and Starks (1997) conducted their analysis on institutional investment and return autocorrelation / cross-
autocorrelation using stocks from the NYSE. 
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Table 2: Contemporaneous Correlation between HI and LO stocks. 
 RLO1 RHI1 RLO2 RHI2 RLO3 RHI3 RLO4 RHI4 RLO5 RHI5 
RLO1 1          
RHI1 0.061** 1         
RLO2 0.188** 0.152** 1        
RHI2 0.083** 0.153** 0.230** 1       
RLO3 0.120** 0.022 0.141** 0.075** 1      
RHI3 0.165** -0.262** 0.049** -0.013 0.086** 1     
RLO4 -0.124** 0.206** -0.193** -0.011 -0.150** -0.210** 1    
RHI4 0.017 0.053** -0.020 -0.008 0.025 0.013 0.128** 1   
RLO5 0.045** 0.240** 0.119** 0.086** 0.025 -0.116** 0.056** 0.054** 1  
RHI5 0.166** -0.122** 0.205** 0.055** 0.133** 0.164** -0.266** 0.001 0.094** 1 
           
Note: ** and * refers to statistical significance at the 5% and 10% level. The table 
shows the correlation coefficients for the returns of the low and high institutionally 
owned stocks,  RLOi and RHIi  respectively, in each size based quintile i respectively. i = 
1 refers to the largest size quintile while i = 5 is the smallest size quintile.  
 
Table 3: Own Autocorrelation Coefficients 
 
 
Notes: ** and * refers to statistical significance at the 5% and 10% level. The table reports the 
first- through fifth-order autocorrelation coefficients for the returns of the HI and LO stocks (RHI 
and RLO respectively).  
Quintile Stock ρ1 ρ2 ρ3 ρ4 ρ5 
       
1 
RHI -0.015 0.023 0.031 0.011 0.015 
RLO 0.141** 0.119** 0.048** 0.034* 0.017 
       
2 
RHI 0.032 0.028 0.026 0.003 0.011 
RLO 0.044** 0.167** 0.060** 0.031 0.038* 
       
3 
RHI 0.159** 0.093** 0.027 -0.021 0.004 
RLO 0.318** 0.151** 0.066** 0.034* 0.053** 
       
4 
RHI 0.117** 0.241** 0.006 0.012 0.006 
RLO 0.128** 0.129** 0.081** 0.060** 0.027 
       
5 
RHI 0.147** 0.003 0.001 -0.004 0.005 
RLO -0.054** 0.127** -0.159** 0.160** 0.081** 
       
 
 
17 
 
Table 2 depicts the contemporaneous correlation between the returns of the HI and LO stocks 
in each size quintile, while Table 3 reports, for each quintile, the first- through fifth-order 
autocorrelation coefficients for the returns of the HI and LO stocks. We find that the majority 
of the autocorrelation coefficients on the HI stocks are not statistically significant, with the 
HI stock in the largest quintile having no significant coefficients. By contrast, the bulk of the 
statistically significant autocorrelation coefficients for the LO stocks are positive. The low 
autocorrelation in the HI stocks is consistent with the hypothesis that the high institutionally 
owned stocks adjust quickly to common information. In addition, the positive autocorrelation 
in LO stocks suggests that these stocks adjust slowly to information. 
  
Table 4: Cross-Correlation Coefficients 
 
Quintile 
1 
Quintile 
2 
Quintile 
3 
Quintile 
4 
Quintile 
5 
      
ρ(RLO,t RHI,t) 0.061** 0.230** 0.086** 0.128** 0.094** 
      
ρ(RLO,t,RHI,t-1) 0.050** 0.231** 0.264** -0.046** 0.018 
ρ(RHI,t,RLO,t-1) 0.089** -0.069** 0.053** -0.055** 0.017 
      
ρ(RLO,t,RHI,t-2) 0.127** 0.077** 0.179** 0.061** 0.041** 
ρ(RHI,t,RLO,t-2) 0.027 0.013 0.016 0.011 0.007 
      
ρ(RLO,t,RHI,t-3) -0.017 0.035* -0.011 0.059** 0.150** 
ρ(RHI,t,RLO,t-3) 0.009 0.011 0.019 -0.038* -0.012 
      
ρ(RLO,t,RHI,t-4) 0.065** 0.012 0.063** 0.091** -0.014 
ρ(RHI,t,RLO,t-4) 0.001 0.004 -0.012 0.016 -0.053** 
      
ρ(RLO,t,RHI,t-5) 0.081** 0.058** 0.028 0.083** 0.007 
ρ(RHI,t,RLO,t-5) -0.004 -0.011 0.016 -0.007 0.019 
      
 
Note: ** and * refers to statistical significance at the 5% and 10% level. The table shows the cross-correlation 
coefficients for RLO and RHI in each size based quintile. Specifically, ρ(RLO,t,RHI,t-i) refers to the cross-correlation 
between RLO,t and RHI,t-i  while ρ(RHI,t,RLO,t-i) depicts the cross-correlation between RHI,t, and RLO,t-i . i = 1,…,5.   
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Finally, Table 4 provides some initial evidence of lead-lag cross-autocorrelation between the 
HI and LO stocks. Specifically, it reports the contemporaneous correlations between both 
types of stocks for each quintile. It also provides the first- through fifth-order cross-
autocorrelations coefficients between the lagged returns on the HI stocks and the current 
returns on the LO stocks in each quintile. We find that the contemporaneous correlation 
between the HI and LO stocks in all quintiles is positive and statistically significant. In 
addition, for each quintile, the extent to which the lagged HI returns are correlated with the 
current LO returns, is generally greater than the extent to which the lagged LO returns are 
correlated with the current HI returns. This asymmetry in the cross-autocorrelation provides 
some preliminary evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the lagged returns of the high 
institutionally owned stocks predict the current returns of the low institutionally owned stocks 
better than vice versa. However, this cross-autocorrelation pattern could be a manifestation of 
the high autocorrelation in the returns of the LO firms (observed in Table 3) coupled with 
high contemporaneous correlation between the between the HI and LO firms.
17
 The lagged 
returns of the HI firms may be noisy proxies for the lagged returns of the LO firms, and once 
the lagged returns of the LO firms are controlled for, this cross-correlation pattern could 
disappear. It is essential therefore to control for the lagged LO returns in the VAR analysis.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
 
Table 5 presents the results of the bivariate VAR analysis. The VARs are estimated using the 
returns of the highest (HI) and lowest (LO) institutionally favoured stocks in five size 
quintiles: (LO1, HI1), (LO2, HI2), (LO3, HI3), (LO4, HI4), (LO5, HI5). The suffixes 1…5 denote 
the size quintiles, with 1 representing the highest quintile and 5 the lowest. The number of 
lags in each VAR is selected on the basis of the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and the 
                                                          
17
This is also pointed out by Boudoukh et al. (1994), Hameed (1997) and Hou (2007). 
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Schwarz Information Criteria (SIC). Where these two criteria indicate different lag lengths, 
the lesser lag length is chosen for the sake of parsimony. The sum of the coefficients reported 
is the sum of the cross-autoregressive slope coefficients, namely 
1
K
kk
b
  from equation (1) or 
1
K
kk
c
 from equation (2), as per the dependent variable.  
 
There is strong evidence that the lagged returns of the highest institutionally owned stocks 
(HI) predict the contemporaneous returns on the stocks with the lowest institutional 
ownership (LO). For each size quintile, the Wald (a) statistics are statistically significant, 
implying that the sum of the slope coefficients corresponding to the lagged returns of the HI 
stocks,
1
K
kk
b
 , is typically different from zero. In addition, 1
K
kk
b
 is positive in each quintile, 
which implies that the cross-autocorrelation relationship between stock HI and LO is positive. 
There is, however, little evidence that the lagged returns on LO stocks reliably forecast the 
current returns on HI stocks. We find that for four size quintiles (2, 3, 4 and 5), the sum of the 
coefficients on the lagged returns of the LO stocks are not statistically different from zero, as 
implied by the insignificant Wald (a) statistics. For these four quintiles, therefore, the lagged 
returns of the LO stocks are unable to predict the current returns of the HI stocks. 
 
Furthermore, the results also show that for each size quintile, the ability of the lagged HI 
stock returns to predict the current LO stock returns exceeds the ability of the lagged LO 
stock returns to predict current HI stock returns. For each of the five pairs of regressions, the 
sum of the bk coefficients on the lagged HI stocks are found to exceed the sum of the ck, 
coefficients on the lagged LO stocks  1 1
K K
k kk k
b c
 
  while the Wald (b) test statistic rejects 
the null hypothesis that
1 1
K K
k kk k
b c
 
  . These results confirm our hypothesis that the returns  
of the HI stocks lead the returns of the LO stocks. 
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Table 5: Vector Autoregressions for the Size-Institutional Ownership Stocks 
Quintile 
Dependent 
Variable 
Lag 
Length 
Sum of 
Coefficients 
Wald (a) Wald (b) 
HI leads 
LO 
1 
RLO1,t 3 0.293 8.763** 
6.915** Yes 
RHI1,t 3 0.031 7.962** 
       
2 
RLO2,t 3 0.663 76.111** 
73.332** Yes 
RHI2,t 3 -0.035 1.715 
       
3 
RLO3,t 3 0.211 17.771** 
17.482** Yes 
RHI3,t 3 -0.070 2.461 
       
4 
RLO4,t 6 0.288 7.085** 
8.157** Yes 
RHI4,t 6 -0.032 1.201 
       
5 
RLO5,t 7 0.352 7.203** 
6.975** Yes 
RHI5,t 7 0.017 0.046 
       
Note: ** and * refers to statistical significance at the 5% and 10% level. The endogenous variables, RLOi,t and RHIi,t, 
are the daily returns on the stocks with the lowest and highest institutional ownership respectively, within each size 
based quintile i. i = 1 refers to the largest size quintile while i = 5 is the smallest size quintile. The lag length in 
each regression is selected on the basis of the Akaike (1974) and Schwartz (1978) information criteria. The sum of 
the coefficients reported is the sum of the cross-autoregressive coefficients, namely
1
K b
kk 
from equation (1) or
1
K
ck k
  from equation (2), as per the dependent variable. For example, when RLOi,t  is the dependent variable, the 
sum of the coefficients provided is 
1
K b
kk 
, which indicates the extent that lagged RHIi,t can forecast current RLOi,t. 
Wald (a) is the Wald statistic obtained from a joint test of the null hypothesis that 
1
K b
kk 
= 0 and 1
K
ck k
  = 0. 
Wald (b) is the Wald statistic corresponding to the cross-equation null hypothesis that 1 1k
K K
b ck k k
   . If the 
ability of the lagged RHIi,t to predict the current RLO1,t is better than the ability of the lagged RLOi,t to predict the 
current RHIi,t , then the following criteria must be fulfilled: (1) Wald (a) should be statistically significant, rejecting 
the null
1
K b
kk 
= 0, (2) the Wald (b) test should reject the null 1 1k
K K
b ck k k
   , and (3) 1
K b
kk 
> 1
K
ck k
  . This 
would imply that the RHIi,t adjusts to new information faster than RLOi,t. 
 
As an initial check on the reliability of our base results, we investigated the cross-
autocorrelation between an equally weighted market portfolio (MP) and first HI stocks and 
then LO stocks. These estimation results are set out in Appendix tables A.4 and A.5 
respectively. Overall, these results indicate that the stocks returns of firms with high 
institutional ownership lead the market portfolio, while the returns of MP lead the returns of 
LO. The above results are consistent with the faster adjustment of institutionally favoured 
stocks than the market portfolio (which is a mixture of HI and LO stocks) to new information, 
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but with the market portfolio adjusting to current information more quickly than the low 
institutional ownership stocks. By the time that low institutionally owned stocks reflect new 
information, this information will have already been incorporated in the historical returns of 
the market portfolio, giving rise to a lead-lag effect from the market portfolio to the low 
institutionally owned stocks. 
 
Brennan et al. (1993) document that the level of analyst coverage received by firms also 
affects the speed of stock price adjustment to information. The higher the number of analysts 
covering a firm, the greater the information generated about that firm. This increases the 
number of informed investors, which in turn causes its share price to reflect more information 
rapidly. As such, the prices of stocks with higher analyst coverage impound information 
faster than those stocks with a lower coverage. This gives rise to a lead-lag effect where the 
firms with high analyst coverage lead the returns of firms with low analyst coverage. 
  
The analyst coverage of a particular firm is defined here as the number of analysts making annual 
earnings forecasts for that firm in December of the previous year. In our sample, the cross-
sectional correlation between analyst coverage and institutional investors is statistically 
significant at the 5% level: ρ = 0.389. This positive correlation naturally leads to the question 
of whether the analyst coverage effects are captured by the institutional ownership effects, or 
vice versa. We therefore repeat the above cross-autocorrelation analysis, while controlling for 
any effects which the level of analyst coverage received by the listed firms may have on the 
lead-lag relationship.  
 
We control for the effects of analyst coverage similar to the manner in which we previously 
controlled for firm size. Five analyst coverage quintiles are formed, by ranking all listed firms 
 
 
22 
 
according to the average analyst coverage received by each of them (measured by the number 
of analysts following each firm/stock over the period 2001 to 2012).
18
 In each quintile, we 
test whether the returns of the highest institutional ownership stock leads the returns of the 
lowest institutionally owned stock. This testing is also conducted in a bivariate VAR 
framework, and the results are presented in Table 6.  
 
Table 6: Vector Autoregressions for the Analyst-Institutional Ownership Stocks 
Quintile 
Dependent 
Variable 
Lag 
Length 
Sum of 
Coefficients 
Wald (a) Wald (b) 
HI leads 
MP 
1 
RLO1,t 3 0.182 11.198** 
7.013** Yes 
RHI1,t 3 0.022 0.738 
       
2 
RLO2,t 4 0.176 4.377** 
5.004** Yes 
RHI2,t 4 -0.015 1.021 
       
3 
RLO3,t 4 0.066 1.265 
0.438 No 
RHI3,t 4 0.024 0.985 
       
4 
RLO4,t 5 0.176 12.068** 
7.674** Yes 
RHI4,t 5 0.068 1.226 
       
5 
RLO5,t 3 0.227 20.785** 
6.137** Yes 
RHI5,t 3 0.048 0.854 
       
 
Note: ** and * refers to statistical significance at the 5% and 10% level. See also notes for Table 5. 
 
We find that the results are generally consistent with those in Table 5. Table 6 confirms that 
there is a lead-lag cross-autocorrelation from the HI to the LO stocks. Specifically, the extent 
to which the informational content of the historical returns of the HI stocks is relevant to the 
current pricing of the LO stocks is greater than vice versa.  
 
                                                          
18
 To rank the listed firms, we take the average of the number of analysts for each firm over the eight year 
sample period. This information is obtained from the research department of the TTSEC. This measure of 
analyst coverage is also used in Brennan et al. (1993) and Chuang and Lee (2011). 
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6. Extending the Analysis  
  6.1.   Liquidity Effects 
We extend the analysis from the previous section by exploring whether the institutional 
ownership role in the identified lead-lag effect is proxing for or fashioned by liquidity 
effects.
19
. For this purpose, we estimate equation (3), which allows both for the possibility of 
a direct effect of liquidity on the lead-lag relation from the HI to the LO stocks in each size-
based quintile and for a conditioning or interaction effect via the level of institutional 
ownership : 
     
, 1, , - 2, , - 1,k , - 2, , -
1 1 1 1
3, 4,- -
1 1
           * *                                          3
K K K K
LOi t LOi k LO t k k LO t k HI t k k HI t k
k k K K
K K
k HI HI k HI LO tt k t k
k k
R a R a Liq b R b Liq
b R Liq b R Liq


   
 
        
  
 
where ,HI tR and ,LO tR denote the returns of the stocks HI and LO respectively at time t. LiqLO,t 
and LiqHI,t  denote the liquidity of low institutional ownership and high institutional 
ownership stocks respectively, on day t. We measure liquidity using the volume of LO and HI 
stocks traded on each day.
20
 
21
 As a robustness check we have also used stock turnover as a 
measure of liquidity. Our conclusions are not affected by which measure we use (see Table 
A.6 in the Appendix). 
 
The results of this estimation are presented in Table 7. Panels A to E of this table provide the 
results for each size- based quintile, with Panel A reporting the results for the largest quintile 
(dependent variable - RLO,1)  and Panel E reporting the results for the smallest quintile 
                                                          
19
As pointed earlier, Chordia and Swaminathan (2000) argue that variation in 
 liquidity across stocks is a possible reason for lead-lag effects. 
20
Jones et al. (1994) and Datar et al. (1998) argue that volume traded and volume related measures of liquidity 
are highly correlated with the number of trades (trading frequency), which is the most direct measure of 
liquidity. To this end, we measure liquidity using the daily volume of stocks traded. 
21
We control for liquidity, specifically the volume traded, since there is likely to be a causal relationship 
between volume traded and stock returns. Evidence of this is given in a number of studies including Jennings, 
Starks and Fellingham (1981), Gallant, Rossi and Tauchen (1992), Heimstra and Jones (1994), Blume, Easley 
and O’Hara (1994) and Brennan, Chordia and Subramanyam (1998). 
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(dependent variable - RLO,5). We present the sum of the coefficients of each explanatory 
variable in the regression in column (2). Column (3) gives the Wald test statistics for the null 
hypothesis that the sums of the coefficients of the explanatory variables are statistically 
different significantly different from zero. The joint test is a Wald test of the null hypothesis 
that the coefficients of all explanatory variables are jointly significant. The direct liquidity 
effect is captured by the sum of the a2 or b2 coefficients in eq. 3, and the conditioning effect 
from the sum of the b3 or b4 coefficients. 
 
Table 7: Impact of Liquidity on Cross-autocorrelation 
Equation  (1) Sum of Coefficients Wald Test 
Panel A: (Quintile 1) Dependent Variable - RLO1,t 
RLO1,t 0.234 59.805** 
RHI1,t-k 0.292 8.423** 
LiqHI1,t-k 6.13E-09                 1.034 
LiqLO1,t-k 3.13E-09 1.201 
RHI1,t-k* LiqHI1,t-k 1.12E-06 10.322** 
RHI1,t-k* LiqLO1,t-k -1.70E-06 34.080** 
AIC/SIC = 3  Joint test =  208.776**  Adj-R
2 
= 0.073 
Panel B: (Quintile 2) Dependent Variable – RLO2,t 
RLO2,t 0.188 31.166** 
RHI2,t-k 0.626 94.243** 
LiqHI2,t-k -1.29E-08 0.189 
LiqLO2,t-k 7.54E-09 9.371** 
RHI2,t-k* LiqHI2,t-k 4.86E-06 12.329** 
RHI2,t-k* LiqLO2,t-k -5.58E-06 16.248** 
AIC/SIC=3  Joint test: Wald = 430.007**  Adj-R
2 
= 0.145 
 Panel C: (Quintile 3) Dependent Variable - RLO3,t 
RLO3,t 0.176 28.160** 
RHI3,t-k 0.317 10.429** 
LiqHI3,t-k 2.78E-09 0.604 
LiqLO3,t-k 1.01E-08 3.002* 
RHI3,t-k* LiqHI3,t-k 1.05E-06 6.306** 
RHI3,t-k* LiqLO3,t-k -9.26E-07 5.059** 
AIC/SIC=3  Joint test: Wald = 244.611**Adj-R
2 
= 0.185 
 Panel D: (Quintile 4) Dependent Variable - RLO4,t 
 RLO4,t -0.459 78.566** 
RHI4,t-k 0.520 7.289** 
LiqHI4,t-k 3.53E-09 0.273 
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LiqLO4,t-k 4.02E-08 4.731** 
RHI4,t-k* LiqHI4,t-k 1.05E-05 25.126** 
RHI4,t-k* LiqLO4,t-k -3.04E-05 23.356** 
AIC/SIC = 4  Joint test: Wald = 565.589**  Adj-R
2 
= 0.221 
Panel E: (Quintile 5) Dependent Variable - RLO5,t 
RLO5,t 0.280 77.031** 
RHI5,t-k 0.195 16.744** 
LiqHI5,t-k -1.85E-09 0.422 
LiqLO5,t-k 7.60E-08 4.064** 
RHI5,t-k* LiqHI5,t-k 4.51E-07 7.127** 
RHI5,t-k* LiqLO5,t-k -1.08E-06 39.757** 
AIC/SIC=3  Joint test: Wald =  266.012**  Adj-R
2 
= 0.416 
Note: ** and * refers to statistical significance at 5% and 10%. The lag length in each regression is selected on the 
basis of the Akaike (1974) and Schwartz (1978) information criteria.  The Wald test reports chi-square statistics 
for the null hypothesis that the sums of the coefficients of each explanatory variable are statistically significant. 
 
It is clear from Table 6 that the liquidity of the HI stocks influences the extent to which the 
HI stocks lead the LO stocks. We find that the sum of the coefficients on the lagged 
interaction term 𝑅𝐻𝐼 ∗ 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝐻𝐼 is positive in each quintile, and strongly significant in all five 
quintiles. The results are consistent with a hypothesis that the lead-lag relation from the 
returns of the HI stocks to the returns of the LO stocks is stronger when the HI stocks are 
more liquid. This can be attributed to the HI stocks responding to contemporaneous market-
wide information more rapidly when their liquidity increases.  
 
The results in Table 6 further suggest that the ability of the HI returns to lead the LO returns 
diminishes with an increase in the LO stock liquidity. In all quintiles, we find that the sum of 
the coefficients on the lagged interaction term 𝑅𝐻𝐼 ∗ 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝐿𝑂 is negative and statistically 
different from zero. Such findings arise as higher liquidity in the LO stocks reduces the delay 
to which new market-wide information is reflected in the prices of these stocks. Although 
information is impounded in the HI stocks first, causing HI to lead LO, a faster adjustment of 
the LO stocks to new information lowers the extent to which the informational content of the 
lagged HI stocks returns are useful for the future pricing of the LO stocks. This could have 
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implications for arbitrage activity in the equity market. Arbitrageurs, who are aware of the 
lead-lag relation from HI to LO stocks, may attempt to profit by using the historical prices of 
the HI stocks to predict the future prices of the LO stocks.  
 
  6.2.   Portfolio Approach 
We also assess the validity of our results by adopting a portfolio approach. Specifically, we 
examine whether the returns of portfolios consisting of HI stocks lead the returns of 
portfolios consisting of LO stocks. The portfolios are constructed as follows. Three equal size 
based terciles are formed by ranking the thirty stocks in our sample according to their average 
market capitalisation for the sample period. These terciles are then divided into two equal 
portfolios, based on their average level of institutional ownership for the sample period. For 
each of these terciles, we test whether the returns of the portfolio with the higher level of 
institutional ownership (RPHI) leads the portfolio with the lower level of institutional 
ownership (RPLO).
22
 The sum of the coefficients reported is the sum of the cross-
autoregressive coefficients. For example, when RPLOi,t  is the dependent variable, the sum of 
the coefficients indicates the extent that lagged RPHIi,t can forecast current RPLOi,t. 
 
Table 7: Vector Autoregressions for the Size-Institutional Ownership Portfolios 
Tercile 
Dependent 
Variable 
Lag 
Length 
Sum of 
Coefficients 
Wald (a) Wald (b) 
HI leads 
LO 
1 
RPLO1,t 4 0.406 7.963** 
7.532** Yes 
RPHI1,t 4 0.005 0.037 
       
2 RPLO2,t 3 0.436 5.904** 5.296** Yes 
                                                          
22
 We find that the ranking of stocks according to their market capitalisation and institutional ownership levels 
in each year of the sample period does not generally change. Therefore, if three size based terciles are formed in 
each year by ordering stocks according to their market capitalisation, then the same stocks will comprise the HI 
and LO portfolios in each tercile. As such, using an average of the market capitalisation and institutional 
ownership levels, for each stock over the sample period, provides an unambiguous depiction of lead-lag effects 
in the TTSE. 
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RPHI2,t 3 0.022 2.928* 
       
3 
RPLO3,t 3 0.177 24.870** 
10.432** Yes 
RPHI3,t 3 -0.135 2.265 
       
 Note: ** and * denote statistical significance at the 5 % and 10% levels respectively. See also notes for Table 5. 
 
The table shows that in each size based tercile, RPHI leads RPLO. Specifically, the lagged 
values of RPHI exhibit statistically significant predictive power for future returns on RPLO. 
The lagged values of RPLO however exhibit no ability to predict future RPHI in two of the 
three terciles. Moreover, the Wald (b) test statistic for the cross-equation hypothesis that RPHI 
predicts RPLO better than vice versa, is statistically significant in each quintile. Overall, these 
results closely parallel the previous findings that stocks with a higher level of institutional 
investment adjust to market-wide information faster than stocks with lower institutional 
ownership.  
 
  6.3.   Dimson Beta Regressions  
We further investigate lead-lag effects between HI and LO stocks using the market model 
regression outlined in Dimson (1979).
23
 This model specifically assesses the speed of 
adjustment of HI and LO stocks to contemporaneous and lagged market-wide information. 
The intuition behind this model is as follows. If HI leads LO, then HI should have greater 
sensitivity to current market-wide information than LO, while LO should be more responsive 
to lagged market-wide information than HI.  
 
To illustrate this model, consider a zero net investment stock O, which is long in stock HI and 
short in stock LO. The returns of O are constructed as the difference between the returns of 
                                                          
23
 Prior studies that use the Dimson (1979) market model for assessing the speed of adjustment hypothesis 
include Brennan et al. (1993) , Chordia and Swaminathan (2000) and Park and Chung (2007). 
 
 
28 
 
HI and LO (RO = RHI - RLO). As a proxy of market wide information, the model uses the 
returns of an equally weighted market portfolio (RMP).
24
 RO is regressed on the leads, lags and 
contemporaneous RMP as follows: 
t
K
k
ktMPkOtMPO
K
k
ktMPkOOtO RRRR  



 
1
,,,0,
1
,,,       (4) 
where kLOkHIkO ,,,   . Stock HI adjusts to market-wide information faster than stock LO 
if: (1) the contemporaneous beta of stock HI, 0,HI , is greater than the contemporaneous beta 
of stock LO, 0,LO , and (2) the sum of the lagged betas of stock HI, 


k
K
ktHI
1
, , is less than the 
sum of the lagged betas of stock LO, 


k
K
ktLO
1
, . In terms of equation (4), this translates into 
testing whether (1) the contemporaneous coefficient 0,O  is positive and statistically 
significant, and (2) the sum of the lagged coefficients 


K
k
ktkO
1
,,  is negative and statistically 
different from zero. If HI has a faster speed of adjustment than LO, then its sensitivity to 
current market-wide information (RMP) should be higher than that of LO. Therefore, we 
expect that the contemporaneous coefficient of the zero investment stock should be positive, 
that is,   .00,0,0,  LOHIO   Moreover, if LO responds slowly to current information, it 
should have a greater sensitivity to historical market-wide information (lagged MP) relative 
to HI. Therefore, we expect the sum of the lagged betas of the zero investment stock to be 
negative, that is,

 
K
k
ktkO
1
,, .0  To this end, HI leads LO provided that 00, O  and 


 
K
k
ktkO
1
,, 0 . Similar to the VAR methodology, we examine the restriction 

 
K
k
ktkO
1
,, 0  
using a Wald test. 
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 The market portfolio is constructed by taking an average of the returns of all stocks traded on the TTSE. 
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Table 8 provides the results of the Dimson (1979) market model regression for each size 
based quintile. Similar to the VAR methodology, the lag length in each regression is selected 
using the AIC and SIC. The sum of the coefficients provided is the sum of the lag and lead 
betas of the zero net investment stock in equation (4), namely  
 

K
k
K
k
ktkOktkO
1 1
,,,,   and 
respectively. The contemporaneous coefficient denotes 
0,O from equation (4).   
 
Table 8: Dimson Beta Regressions for the Size-Institutional Ownership 
Quintile 
Dependent 
Variable 
Lag 
Length 
Sum of Coefficients  Contemporaneous 
Coefficient 
HI leads 
LO Lags Leads  
1 RO1,t 4 -0.321** 0.229**  0.147** Yes 
        
2 RO2,t 4 -0.519** 0.472**  0.125* Yes 
        
3 RO3,t 3 -0.278** 0.222**  0.114** Yes 
        
4 RO4,t 4 -0.360** 0.293**  0.211** Yes 
        
5 RO5,t 5 -0.222** 0.581**  0.484** Yes 
        Note: ** and * to statistical significance at the 5% and 10% level. The lag length in each regression is selected on 
the basis of the Akaike (1974) and Schwartz (1978) information criteria. The sum of the coefficients reported are 
the sum of the lagged betas, 



K
k
ktkO
1
,,
, and the sum of the lead betas 



K
k
ktkO
1
,,
in equation (4). The 
contemporaneous coefficient refers to 
0,O in equation (1). If the RHI has a faster speed of adjustment, and 
therefore leads RLO, then the following restrictions must be fulfilled: (1) 0,O must be positive and statistically 
significant, and (2) 



K
k
ktkO
1
,,
must be negative and statistically significantly different from 0.  
 
The results provide strong evidence that HI leads LO, which support the initial findings of the 
VAR in Table 5. In each size quintile, the contemporaneous beta 0,O  is positive and 
statistically significant, suggesting that HI stocks are more sensitive to current market-wide 
information than LO stocks. Also, the sum of the lag coefficients 


K
k
ktkO
1
,, is negative and 
statistically different from zero in each size quintile, implying that LO stocks are more 
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responsive to historical market-wide information. Overall, these results indicate that the 
returns on the HI stocks adjust faster to market-wide information, and therefore lead the 
returns of LO stocks. 
 
 We also note that in each quintile, the sum of the leading coefficients, 


K
k
ktkO
1
,, , are 
significantly different from zero. Chordia and Swaminathan (2000), point out that such 
results indicate HI stocks are able to predict (lead) the future returns of the equally weighted 
market portfolio. This lends support to the findings of lead-lag effects between HI stocks and 
MP provided in Table 9.  
 
Table 9: Dimson Beta Regressions for the Size-Institutional Ownership (Portfolios) 
Quintile 
Dependent 
Variable 
Lag 
Length 
Sum of 
Coefficients 
Wald (a) 
Wald 
(b) 
HI leads MP 
1 
RMP,t 4 0.232 34.659** 
4.840** Yes 
RHI1,t 4 -0.080 2.017 
       
2 
RMP,t 2 0.360 42.971** 
18.986** Yes 
RHI2,t 2 0.107 31.909** 
       
3 
RMP,t 3 0.111 28.825** 
8.568** Yes 
RHI3,t 3 0.027 0.516 
       
4 
RMP,t 3 0.125 12.791** 
4.396** Yes 
RHI4,t 3 0.034 0.134 
       
5 
RMPt 5 0.219 17.191** 
6.667** Yes 
RHI5,t 5 0.112 6.021** 
       
 Note: ** and * to statistical significance at the 5% and 10% level. See also notes for Table 8. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we consider whether differences in the level of institutional investment across 
firms can give rise to lead-lag cross-autocorrelations in an embryonic equity market setting. 
We use firm level data from TTSE for the embryonic stage of development of this emerging 
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equity market, one which experienced a high level of institutional investment over the period 
of investigation. In addition, its microstructures, regulatory and information environments are 
under-developed, making it an ideal setting to assess lead-lag relations in an emerging market 
context. The use of firm level data enables us to accurately represent the pattern of lead-lag 
effects between stocks with different institutional ownerships, which could otherwise be 
hidden if only portfolio level data were used.  
 
We apply this data in a vector autoregression (VAR) framework and find that the level of 
institutional ownership among stocks is a significant determinant of lead-lag cross-
autocorrelation in stock returns. Specifically, the returns of stocks with a high level of 
institutional ownership have substantial predictive power and lead the returns of stocks with a 
low institutional ownership. We attribute this result to the tendency of stocks with a low level 
of institutional ownership to react to information more slowly than the high institutional 
ownership stocks. Such results are consistent with previous studies that explored whether 
lead-lag effects arise due to differences in institutional investments across portfolios in the 
NYSE (see Bardinath et al., 1995; Sias and Starks, 1997; Chuang and Lee; 2011). This 
suggests the level of institutional investment in equities can influence the speed of adjustment 
and give rise to lead-lag effects in international stock markets, regardless of whether they are 
developed or emerging (even in their very early stages of development). We also show that 
the returns of the high institutionally owned stocks lead the returns of the TTSE market 
portfolio. This suggests that the high institutionally owned stocks adjust to information faster 
than the aggregate market portfolio. By contrast, the market portfolio returns are found to 
lead the returns on the low institutionally owned stocks, indicating that the speed of 
adjustment of the low institutionally owned stocks is lower than that of the market portfolio. 
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Additional analysis reveals that, unlike developed stock markets where high institutional 
coverage tends to be associated with high liquidity levels, the degree of institutional 
ownership in TTSE still accounts for lead-lag relationships under the prevailing, relatively 
illiquid market conditions. Further, we show that an increase in the liquidity of high 
institutionally owned stocks can improve the extent to which the returns on these stocks lead 
the returns on the low institutionally owned stocks. This is presumably because an increase in 
the liquidity of the high institutionally owned stocks tends to improve the speed of adjustment 
to information advantages. The extent to which the high institutionally owned stocks lead the 
returns of the low institutionally owned stocks is shown to be tempered also by the liquidity 
of the low institutionally owned stocks. Again this finding is consistent with the speed of 
adjustment of low institutionally favoured stocks to prior changes in the returns of high 
institutionally owned stocks increasing with increase in the liquidity of these stocks. This 
indicates that liquidity effects condition, but do not account for, the institutional ownership 
effect, and provides support for a separate informational effect associated with institutional 
ownership. 
 
The findings have important implications for informational efficiency. First, evidence of 
cross-autocorrelation among stocks indicates return predictability. In particular, the returns of 
the low institutionally owned stocks and the equally weighted market portfolio can be 
predicted using the past returns of the high institutionally owned stocks. This predictability is 
a clear violation of the defining property of market efficiency, which is the unpredictability of 
stock price increments. Second, the returns of the high institutionally owned stocks lead the 
returns on the low institutionally owned stocks and the market portfolio. This implies that the 
high institutionally owned stocks adjust faster to information than the low institutionally 
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owned stocks and the market portfolio.
25
 This is because institutional investors tend to 
actively gather information on the stocks they invest in. As such, they are able to revise their 
valuations of the stocks which they hold and their trading will reflect this information 
quickly. Individual investors, however, tend to gather less information than institutional 
investors. Therefore, the price adjustment of the high institutionally owned stocks would be 
faster than that of the stocks that are mostly held by individual investors. This suggests that 
the high institutionally owned stocks are more informational efficient than the low 
institutionally owned stocks.  
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Appendix Tables 
 
Table A.1: Scale of Trading Activity on the TTSE. 
 
Listed 
Securities  
Market 
Capitalisation 
(USD Millions) 
Average Daily 
Turnover % 
 
Average Daily 
Equity Volume 
Traded (000’s) 
        
2001 30  $5,082.82 3.289   837 
2002 30  $7,695.88 2.204   648 
2003 32  $10,876.73 3.388   2787 
2004 34  $17,209.61 2.804   2052 
2005 34  $17,200.59 3.645   1290 
2006 33  $15,494.13 2.544   1441 
2007 33  $15,708.36 2.178   817 
2008 34  $12,229.26 2.867   605 
2009 33  $11,292.18 2.089   310 
2010 32  $12,444.95 1.112   314 
2011 31  $15,115.41 1.089   2293 
2012 32  $19,001.11 0.632   211 
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Table A.2:  Summary Information on Regional Embryonic Stock Markets (2012) 
Country  
Listed  
Domestic 
Companies 
Market 
Capitalisation  
(% of GDP) 
Turnover Ratio 
% 
   
 
Trinidad & Tobago 32 65 0.8 
Barbados 24 106 0.4 
Bermuda 13 27 2.0 
Bolivia 40 16 0.5 
Colombia 76 71 11.2 
Costa Rica 9 5 1.9 
Ecuador 45 7 2.3 
El Salvador 64 45 0.6 
Jamaica 36 43 3.0 
Panama 25 35 1.0 
Paraguay 62 4 5.5 
Venezuela 41 7 0.2 
    
Notes: The data presented in the table are based on embryonic stock markets from the Latin American and Caribbean region 
with less than 100 listed domestic companies in 2012. Market capitalisation is the average annual market valuation 
expressed as a % of GDP. The turnover ratio is the total value of shares traded during the year expressed as a % of the 
average annual market capitalisation.  
 
Source: World Development Indicators and own data 
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Table A.3: Firms Listed on the TTSE 
Banking Stocks 
BCB Holdings Limited 
First Caribbean International Bank Limited  
National Commercial Bank Jamaica Limited   
Republic Bank Limited  
Scotiabank Trinidad and Tobago Limited  
Conglomerates Stocks 
ANSA McAl Limited Barbados Shipping and Trading Company Limited   
Grace Kennedy Limited  
Neal and Massy Holdings Limited  
Property - PLIPDECO Limited 
Manufacturing Stocks  
Angostura Holdings Limited  
Guardian Media Limited  
National Flour Mills Limited  
One Caribbean Media Limited  
The West Indian Tobacco Company Limited  
Unilever Caribbean Limited  
Berger Paints Trinidad Limited  
Flavorite Foods Limited  
Readymix (West Indies) Limited  
Trinidad Cement Limited  
Trading Stocks  
Agostini Limited  
LJ Williams Limited  
Prestige Holdings Limited  
Supreme Ventures Limited 
Non-Banking Finance Stocks   
ANSA Merchant Bank Limited  
Capital & Credit Financial Group Limited  
Guardian Holdings Limited  
Jamaica Money Market Brokers Limited  
National Enterprises Limited  
Sagicor Financial Corporation  
Scotia Investments Jamaica Limited  
Other Stocks 
Mora Ven Holdings Limited  
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Table A.4: Vector Autoregressions for the Size-High Institutional Ownership Stocks and the Market 
Portfolio 
Quintile 
Dependent 
Variable 
Lag 
Length 
Sum of 
Coefficients 
Wald (a) 
Wald 
(b) 
HI leads MP 
1 
RMP,t 4 0.232 34.659** 
4.840** Yes 
RHI1,t 4 -0.080 2.017 
       
2 
RMP,t 2 0.360 42.971** 
18.986** Yes 
RHI2,t 2 0.107 31.909** 
       
3 
RMP,t 3 0.111 28.825** 
8.568** Yes 
RHI3,t 3 0.027 0.516 
       
4 
RMP,t 3 0.125 12.791** 
4.396** Yes 
RHI4,t 3 0.034 0.134 
       
5 
RMPt 5 0.219 17.191** 
6.667** Yes 
RHI5,t 5 0.112 6.021** 
       
Note: ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 10% levels respectively. See also notes for Table 5. 
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Table A.5: Vector Autoregressions for the Size-Low Institutional Ownership Stocks and the 
Market Portfolio 
Quintile 
Dependent 
Variable 
Lag 
Length 
Sum of 
Coefficients 
Wald (a) Wald (b) 
MP leads 
LO 
1 
RLO1,t 4 0.342 5.499** 
3.420* Yes 
RMP1,t 4 0.076 40.807** 
       
2 
RLO2,t 4 0.634 38.301** 
35.898** Yes 
RMP2,t 4 0.026 3.837* 
       
3 
RLO3,t 4 0.271 4.057** 
0.013 No 
RMP3,t 4 0.022 2.573 
       
4 
RLO4,t 4 0.516 32.781** 
** 31.160** Yes RMP4,t 4 0.045 33.263** 
       
5 
RLO5,t 4 0.251 7.274** 
9.598** Yes 
RMP5,t 4 0.054 0.021 
       
Note: ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 10% levels respectively. See also notes for Table 5. 
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Table A.6: Impact of Liquidity on Cross-autocorrelation (Robustness Check) 
Equation  (1) Sum of Coefficients Wald Test 
Panel A: (Quintile 1) Dependent Variable - RLO1,t 
RLO1,t 0.234 59.709** 
RHI1,t-k 0.288 8.297** 
LiqHI1,t-k 0.601                 1.107 
LiqLO1,t-k 0.264 1.020 
RHI1,t-k* LiqHI1,t-k 79.868 9.008** 
RHI1,t-k* LiqLO1,t-k -125.806 27.793** 
AIC/SIC = 3  Joint test =   205.192**  Adj-R
2 
= 0.071 
*Panel B: (Quintile 2) Dependent Variable – RLO2,t 
RLO2,t 0.190 31.945** 
RHI2,t-k 0.626 94.882* 
LiqHI2,t-k -0.994 0.144 
LiqLO2,t-k 0.602 9.355** 
RHI2,t-k* LiqHI2,t-k 455.113 13.529** 
RHI2,t-k* LiqLO2,t-k -494.314 16.260** 
AIC/SIC=3  Joint test: Wald = 442.152**  Adj-R
2 
= 0.148 
 Panel C: (Quintile 3) Dependent Variable - RLO3,t 
RLO3,t 0.176 28.144** 
RHI3,t-k 0.319 10.636** 
LiqHI3,t-k 0.289 0.712 
LiqLO3,t-k 0.982 3.134* 
RHI3,t-k* LiqHI3,t-k 68.039 4.180** 
RHI3,t-k* LiqLO3,t-k -62.817 3.398* 
AIC/SIC=3  Joint test: Wald = 245.802**Adj-R
2 
= 0.186 
 Panel D: (Quintile 4) Dependent Variable - RLO4,t 
 RLO4,t -0.453 77.029** 
RHI4,t-k 0.475 4.661** 
LiqHI4,t-k 0.377 0.276 
LiqLO4,t-k 4.876 4.770** 
RHI4,t-k* LiqHI4,t-k -801.793 21.906** 
RHI4,t-k* LiqLO4,t-k -2277.133 18.714** 
AIC/SIC = 4  Joint test: Wald = 584.782**  Adj-R
2 
= 0.227 
Panel E: (Quintile 5) Dependent Variable - RLO5,t 
RLO5,t 0.281 77.310** 
RHI5,t-k 0.192 16.571** 
LiqHI5,t-k -0.193 0.514 
LiqLO5,t-k 7.547 4.126** 
RHI5,t-k* LiqHI5,t-k 31.503 5.593** 
RHI5,t-k* LiqLO5,t-k -82.638 38.411** 
AIC/SIC=3  Joint test: Wald =  266.493**  Adj-R
2 
= 0.421 
Note: ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 10% levels respectively. For the above estimations we 
used stock turnover as a measure of liquidity. See also notes for Table 7. 
 
